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Commodity Price Formation in Boom-and-Bust Cycles 
Diego Valiante 
ighly volatile trends and rising inflation 
expectations lurk behind the recent increase in the 
price of food and some raw materials. 
Independently of their nature, commodity prices are 
increasingly playing a crucial role in a world with fast-
growing demand and still-unanswered fundamental 
questions about the sustainability of its economies. Highly 
volatile and soaring price patterns are creating economic 
uncertainty and, particularly when it comes to food prices, 
contributing to political instability in emerging countries. 
The soar in volatility of commodities prices such as oil and 
agricultural products comes at a critical moment when 
European and US economies are struggling to regain the 
ground lost as a result of the recent financial crisis. 
Climbing prices are also causing mounting worries and 
anger on the part of both policy-makers and the public, for 
whom it is unthinkable that after the amount of resources 
dedicated to rescuing the financial system from its own 
troubles, they are now being squeezed by sheer spending 
cuts and soaring commodity prices. Prices, in effect, made 
an astonishing recovery in 2010, reaching pre-crisis peaks. 
Now, however, they are beginning to show some instability 
after a recent one-week drop by 11% at the beginning of 
May. Food crises have gradually become a widespread 
phenomenon, raising fears that growth in emerging markets 
may ultimately be hindered. For instance, food prices in 
India have soared by 18%, while the global price of wheat is 
80% higher than last year. This situation is fomenting 
outrage in the poorest countries across the world, 
contributing to some countries’ strong political instability 
(e.g. Tunisia). The causes are multiple and should invite us 
to reflect on how we might restructure our economies to 
alleviate their adverse effects. 
Despite the heterogeneity of commodities,
1 several common 
factors explain how their prices and volatility are formed: 
1.  Trading practices (both physical and purely ‘financial’) 
2.  Financial markets access 
3.  Market abuse and surveillance 
4.  Competition and market structure 
5.  Sustainability of current supply and demand 
 
                                                        
1 Each commodity has its own market and its own characteristics, 
which are not necessarily related. Markets can be totally different in 
terms of price formation mechanisms. 
These factors, some of which are not entirely new to these 
markets, do not necessarily affect all commodities with the 
same intensity, but they play a different role for different 
commodities. 
Trading practices 
On trading practices, there are generally two conflicting 
views about the surge in some commodity prices and 
volatility (the latter is an historical issue; see Cashin & 
McDermott, 2001), in particular on the role of the 
‘financialisation’ of commodities, i.e. investments in 
commodity indexes and the role of dominant ‘net’ positions 
in derivatives markets (primarily futures and options). On 
the one hand, there are those who believe that the large 
increase in commodity prices has a positive correlation with 
investment in commodity indexes (Tang & Xiong, 2010). 
However, this view does not provide enough empirical 
evidence of an immediate link between soaring trade in 
commodity indexes and spot prices, while the meaningful 
linkage they show is with future prices. Nevertheless, this 
relationship showed negative values at the beginning of this 
century (Gorton & Rouwenhorst, 2006) and it may be 
explained by other underlying causes. In addition, a positive 
price correlation among commodities has consistently 
increased, especially in the last decade. The positive 
correlation, e.g. between energy and non-energy commodity 
prices may be explained by many other factors, such as the 
impact of transportation costs (linked to the oil price) on the 
price of non-energy commodities or exchange rates (the 
downward trend of the dollar against the euro, as well as 
currency revaluations in some emerging countries).  
On the other hand, observers (e.g. Krugman, 2011) argue 
that commodities are in a boom-and-bust cycle, driven by 
the rapid growth of emerging countries and the 
fundamentals of the global economic system. The difference 
between supply and demand (net demand) determines the 
level of prices by reducing or increasing the stockpile levels, 
which ultimately affects spot prices. In particular, net 
demand has strong links with fundamentals and most of all 
with GDP growth, particularly in a world with low barriers 
to international trade.  
The position seems more plausible, but it does not dig 
deeply enough into the complexity of the issue. The figure 
on the following page suggests that this link may be strong 
but it does not necessarily explain the entire trend, which 
can be split into three periods.  
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Figure 1. Trends in commodity prices, stock indices and GDP growth (bars chart, rhs) 
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Source: IMF database, TR-Jefferies and Yahoo Finance. 
 
The first period, lasting until the internet bubble burst at the 
very beginning of the century, shows that the trend of 
commodity prices was led by a constant growth in western 
countries, with two abrupt breaks due to the Asian crisis in 
1998 and the internet bubble in 2000-01. The second period is 
the so-called ‘financialisation’ period, with an astonishing 
growth in commodity prices, reflecting both an extraordinary 
expansion of credit markets and access to financial markets, 
and an unprecedented GDP growth in emerging markets as 
well as in some western countries. This period ends with 
another big drop in commodity prices due to the recent 
financial crisis. In 2008, prices have reached again the levels 
of the end of the first period. This situation fit with the classic 
boom-and-bust cycle.  
Finally, we experienced in the last two years another 
astonishing upward race due to the recovery in western 
countries and the high growth in emerging markets, such as 
China, India and Brazil. However, prices are still below the 
2008 peak and, in the first five months of 2011, the volatility 
of the Thomson Reuters-Jefferies index has doubled in 
comparison to the same period of 2010 (from 6.41 to 13.3). 
Price instability seems likely to remain as long as the 
economic global outlook does not stabilise. The possibility 
that commodities markets will suffer short boom-and-burst 
cycles is fairly high due to the complexity and instability of 
the current global long-term economic outlook.  
Other factors that can affect stockpile levels and consequently 
spot commodity prices include price volatility, future prices, 
supply constraints, transportation costs, market settings and 
exogenous factors (e.g. wars, bad weather).  
Financial markets access 
In the last two decades, access to financial markets has 
become easier and commodity buyers and suppliers are 
increasingly making use of markets to hedge short-term and 
long-term positions. In effect, the nature of commodities is 
fairly complex and their multi-faceted characteristics 
influence the way they are actually traded. For instance, non-
storable commodities such as electricity need to have 
immediate access to both financial and spot markets. 
Electricity companies need to minimise peaks in demand and 
supply; thus when there is a drop in the demand, the company 
will need to find a buyer connected to the network able to 
absorb part of the supply in excess. The use of electricity 
exchanges and more generally of financial transactions to 
hedge critical exposures in the spot market for electricity has 
benefitted the market as a whole in terms of keeping the 
supply of energy stable over time to avoid unmanageable 
operational and infrastructural issues. As a result, the nature 
of hedging non-storable commodities positions is driven by 
the volatility of net demand at a specific point in time, rather 
than by long-term net position. This situation leads market 
participants to seek protection in the spot (exchange) and 
futures markets at a specific date (short-term oriented). For 
storable commodities, however, hedging positions are based 
on the uncertainty on levels of storage driven by the net 
demand and future prices on a wider time horizon (long-term 
oriented). The different nature gives market participants the 
possibility to manage their exposures over time and rely less 
on spot market transactions.  
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Growing uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook, 
evidenced by the rise in the price of commodities such as 
gold, has increased small and big producers and buyers’ needs 
to find protection through the use of sophisticated financial 
transactions, particularly in derivatives markets. These 
markets provide formidable means of hedging against price 
changes in the physical product markets. To be able to offer 
hedging products (thereby allowing ‘inter-temporal choice’) 
for all kinds of commodities and market participants, it is vital 
to be able to access liquid markets
2 to provide a counterparty 
to hedgers, but also to provide financial intermediaries (who 
most often provide this access) with the possibility to hedge 
their financial exposures and to design more customised 
products than plain vanilla exchange-traded futures and 
options. The role of investment funds was originally confined 
to indexes to contribute to the liquidity of markets (noise 
trading) that offer hedging solutions in competition with 
future exchanges (dealer markets). It remains unclear whether 
these activities are the origin of price volatility and spiking 
market trends. Price volatility in commodity markets has been 
historically high (Cashin & McDermott, 2001). However, in 
recent years, the growing uncertainty around the economic 
outlook, mainly stemming from the financial crisis, has 
boosted volatility even higher. Most notably, the daily 
standard deviation of a major commodity index (TRJ-CRB 
index) from 7.15 in 1994 skyrocketed to 74.22 in 2008 before 
settling down to a relatively more stable figure in 2009 
(22.68). Uncertainty exerts a crucial influence on production 
levels and so prices.  
Also monetary policies matter. There is currently a significant 
amount of liquidity (M2) in the economy, due to the uncertain 
global economic outlook and, more importantly, to the loose 
monetary policies (quantitative easing) implemented by 
central banks to contain the spillover effects of the financial 
crisis. This excess of liquidity is most likely putting strong 
upward pressure on prices and will gradually lead central 
banks to tighten their monetary policies by raising interest 
rates. In the eurozone, however, after the rate rise last March, 
the ongoing government debt crisis and the feeble economic 
growth may discourage interventions to cool prices, at least in 
the short run. 
Market abuses and surveillance 
The instability of price patterns also creates political and 
public resentment against undefined enemies, such as ‘market 
speculation’. Since markets would not be liquid with only 
investors betting in the same direction (hedgers), those who 
are investing in private information become an indispensable 
part of the system to create a sufficient buffer of 'noise' 
                                                        
2 A financial market is liquid when it “is almost infinitely tight, which is 
not infinitely deep, and […] resilient enough so that prices eventually 
tend to their underlying value” (Kyle, 1985, p. 1317). Three aspects 
emerge from this definition: i) tightness (which is the possibility to turn 
over a position at the fastest speed technically possible, when needed); 
ii) depth (which refers to the ability of the market to absorb quantities 
without having a large effect on price; it is usually not constant over 
time in some asset classes); and iii) resiliency, which is the speed to 
which prices return to their fundamental value after a move due to 
regular trading or – with more intensity – to external shocks. 
trading. ‘Curbing speculation’ is thus a vague objective, since 
it is hard to simply draw the line between trading based on 
hedging purposes or on private information, and whether 
these trades are benefitting price formation or have a 
manipulative purpose. Instead, regulators may need to 
examine the risks of price manipulation arising from the 
accumulation of dominant/relevant net positions in 
derivatives markets. For instance, the attempt to squeeze the 
market by collecting a dominant/relevant share of commodity 
futures for a specific settlement date may have disruptive 
effects on spot prices, since the dominant owner of a long 
position for that date may exercise unreasonable upward 
pressures on futures prices and thereby indirectly on 
stockpiles and so on spot market prices.  
To reduce the harmful effects of settlement squeezes, 
regulators and supervisors may typically adopt two tools: 
position limits and position management. Position limits 
generally impose a cap on the size of commodity traders’ 
transactions. Some argue, however, that these measures can 
be easily circumvented by trading more frequently with 
smaller sizes, which makes supervision more difficult. 
However, it may be an effective tool in spot markets for non-
storable commodities (such as electricity exchanges), where 
the unjustified acquisition of a relevant share of the market 
may create immediate operational and financial issues for 
competitors. Position management instead seems to be a more 
effective tool for tackling issues in futures markets in general 
and spot markets for storable commodities, since 
manipulation in such markets usually does not result from the 
price impact of the availability of investors to transact a 
security at a specific price but rather from the availability of 
counterparties to bargain a future position. Futures prices may 
be more generally affected by the holding of a dominant net 
position in a commodity for a particular settlement date (so-
called ‘settlement squeezes’), futures prices may thus be 
driven up. This situation may have a similar effect on spot 
prices. Since the availability of settlement dates is actually 
limited, it would be meaningful to collect all trading reports 
and calculate the total net position of an investor in that 
specific market. Position management allows the detection of 
dominant net positions at the end of the trading day. If these 
positions reach a pre-defined threshold, this may create 
unreasonable upward or downward pressures on prices, with 
the consequence that market operators can require traders, at 
the beginning of the next trading day, to reduce their positions 
below a certain level. Other surveillance mechanisms should 
aim at: increasing market transparency; improving general 
access to market data information; sharing information; 
enhancing enforcement powers to fight market abuses and 
creating a sufficiently strong and uniform regime of sanctions 
for this kind of market abuses. 
Competition and market structure 
Other issues related to market structure – such as competition 
bottlenecks, supply constraints and exogenous shocks – can 
affect the ‘regular’ price trends for commodities, in particular 
for spot markets. Supply constraints, such as limited 
extraction activities due to environmental sustainability 
measures, can reduce the level of stockpiles and increase spot 4 | Diego Valiante 
prices. Higher spot prices may also be the result of the 
competitive design of a commodity market, e.g. the OPEC 
cartel’s efforts to determine the oil price by controlling oil 
extraction is a classic example. Other competitive bottlenecks 
may affect prices too, such as the use of reference price 
indexes that are the result of special agreements among a few 
big industry players in order to determine the final spot price. 
Yet, the bottleneck in the final distribution of the commodity, 
due to high freight costs or directly to anti-competitive 
practices, is another determinant of price formation in 
commodities spot markets. Likewise, exogenous factors are 
also a primary source of price changes. In 2010, weather and 
other exogenous shocks, such as war tensions and political 
instability in some Middle Eastern countries, have affected 
the production levels of large exporters. The weather-related 
supply shock for wheat, for instance, has significantly 
contributed to upward pressures on food prices (Roache, 
2010). 
Conclusions 
The sharp and widespread increase in most commodity prices 
has alarmed the world and raised questions around the 
sustainability of our economies. The global demand for some 
commodities (e.g. oil) has reached unprecedented peaks. 
Fears that rising food and commodity prices can create severe 
political instability and violent internal and cross-border 
tensions have prompted leading policy-makers (e.g. the G20) 
to issue warnings about the future of the global economy. The 
reasons for this dramatic rise are multiple, and engaging in a 
witch-hunt benefits neither the market as a whole nor our 
economies. Solutions need to be more differentiated and 
oriented towards two factors: preventing price manipulation 
(through financial transactions and anti-competitive market 
structures) and fostering sustainability. Reducing the market 
conditions that can stimulate manipulative behaviour means 
not only intervening in financial markets to limit price 
manipulation through more active controls on dominant net 
positions but also creating competitive market settings where 
production becomes gradually less subject to manipulation by 
vested interests and cartels. Finally, more attention must be 
given to the elephant in the room. The uncontrolled growth of 
emerging markets, which may ultimately generate strong 
incentives to increase profits by wasting natural resources, if 
not properly managed, raises questions about the 
sustainability of some economic policies. 
 
The future challenge will be not so much to capture the 
complexity of these variables in a sophisticated mathematical 
model to predict price movements but rather to hold all these 
variables together to design more efficient and sustainable 
policies for the future. Prices are ultimately only the warning 
signal of a more fundamental question that looms over the 
world’s economies. 
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